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We analyze the participation and childcare decisions made by mothers in 
two-parent households with children aged 0-12 in the Netherlands, paying 
special attention to the role of attitudes regarding work and care. In a 
multinomial logit model we distinguish between not working, a small part-
time job, and a larger job. For working mothers we consider no childcare, 
informal, and formal childcare. We account for potential endogeneity of 
attitudes. The results show that the role of the price of formal childcare in 
the  decision-making  process  is  negligible.  A  higher  earnings  capacity 
increases  the  take-up  of  larger  jobs  and  formal  childcare.  Modern 
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1. Introduction 
 
Availability of childcare services is considered to be an important factor to increase women’s 
labor  force  participation.  Public  policies  aimed  to  achieve  this  objective  generally  focus  on 
incentives generated by net wages and prices of childcare, as does the economic theory (Blau and 
Currie,  2004;  Connelly,  1992;  Ribar,  1995;  Michalopoulos  and  Robins,  2000).  An  important 
prerequisite for such policies to be effective is that parents are sensitive to economic incentives. 
Parents must be willing to combine a job with the care for the children while leaving part of the 
care to other (professional or informal) caregivers. Monna and Gauthier (2008) argue that in 
decisions regarding the amount of time parents spend with their children, norms and values are 
important factors, next to socio economic factors. Therefore, the role of attitudes and opinions 
regarding childcare should be taken into account in the modeling of the decision making process 
(Hakim, 2000; Kremer, 2005). Our main hypothesis is that attitudes held by mothers regarding 
non maternal childcare and working mothers are important factors when making decisions about 
care for children. 
In  addition  to  the  incentives  commonly  used  in  the  economics  literature,  that  is,  the 
mother’s potential income, the other income in the household and the prices of formal childcare 
services (which highly depend on the prevailing subsidy system), in this paper we pay ample 
attention to the role of attitudes in decisions about work and childcare. The integration of socio 
economic and psychological factors in one decision making framework is rather novel in the 
literature. Joesch and Hiedemann (2002) hypothesize that external childcare is not acceptable for 
many parents but they do not have information to their avail to test this. An exception is Van 
Gameren and Ooms (2009), who show that individual attitudes and opinions regarding childcare 
and work are important factors in the labor force participation and childcare utilization decisions 
of mothers with pre school age children. The paper at hand extends Van Gameren and Ooms 
(2009)  by  considering  both  pre school  and  school aged  children,  and  by  distinguishing  the 
number of hours worked (part time and full time) and the chosen childcare mode (formal or 
informal). 
The data in this paper are from a survey among mothers in the Netherlands with young 
children  and  contains  information  both  on  economic  incentives  and  on  attitudes  held  by  the 
mothers.  The  mother’s  joint  decision  regarding  labor  force  participation  and  childcare  use  is 
analyzed  by  means  of  a  multinomial  logit  model,  similar  to  e.g.  Michalopoulos  and  Robins 
(2000), Powell (2002), Tekin (2007), and Borra and Palma (2009). We study which factors can 
explain the decision of mothers with children aged between 0 and 12 years to participate in the 
labor market, and, if they decide to participate, whether they accept a small part time job or a 
large  part time  or  full time  job.  For  working  mothers  we  analyze  which  childcare  mode  is 
chosen: only within household care, informally organized external childcare, or a combination 
with formally organized and subsidized childcare. In the analysis the issue of endogeneity of the page 3/24 
attitudes is taken care of. Obviously we control for other individual and household characteristics 
such as the mother’s age and the number of children.  
Our main findings are that, in line with economic theory and the literature, the mother’s 
earnings capacity and the general economic situation of the household are important factors in the 
mother’s  participation  decision  and  in  the  use  of  non maternal  childcare.  Inclusion  of  the 
attitudes as explanatory factors reduces the relevance of the income variables, and it appears that 
more  positive  attitudes  towards  childcare  and  work  are  crucial  factors  for  participation  and 
childcare  use.  In  contrast  with  economic  theory,  but  in  line  with  the  literature  studying  the 
Netherlands, childcare costs have a negligible effect.  
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews of the recent literature, 
followed by a section that provides the theoretical background and defines more precisely the 
empirical strategy and the different choices that mothers can make. After the presentation of the 
data that are used, we continue with a section that discusses the endogeneity of the attitudes and 
presents the estimation results. The concluding section summarizes the main findings and gives 
some reflections. 
 
2. Empirical literature 
 
There is an extensive literature on labor force participation and childcare usage decisions. We 
work within the framework of the existing models, but emphasize that attitudes about work and 
childcare are an important aspect that is generally not included among the explanatory factors. 
Two main approaches can be observed in the literature, both derived within a utility maximizing 
decision making framework. One stream determines the optimal number of labor and childcare 
hours, accounting for endogenous selection into the observed sample in empirical applications. 
Connelly (1992) and Ribar (1995) are early examples of this approach, and also Van Gameren 
and Ooms (2009) fit in this line of research. The other stream models the mother’s preferred 
alternative from a set of discrete combinations of work and childcare. It is more flexible in the 
sense that a wider variety of options can be considered without forcing them to be measured on a 
continuous scale. Also selection issues are avoided, because every mother is observed to make a 
choice. In this paper we opt for a discrete choice model, outlined in the next section.  
We briefly discuss earlier research, with a focus on the literature that applies discrete 
choice processes. In addition to the literature focused on economic factors we review findings 
regarding attitudes, as it is our intention to disentangle the roles of income, childcare costs, and 
attitudes. A comprehensive review of the literature on childcare and labor decisions can be found 
in Blau and Currie (2004).  
 
Economics research  
A  multinomial  choice  model  that  integrates  the  labor  supply  and  childcare  decisions  is  a 
frequently applied construction, but the precise definitions of the modeled alternatives differ. For page 4/24 
example, regarding employment, Tekin (2007) distinguishes between mothers who do not work, 
have  a  part time  job,  or  are  in  full time  employment.  For  working  mothers  he  analyzes  the 
childcare decision, distinguishing between unpaid childcare (including the mother’s own care), 
paid but unsubsidized care, and subsidized paid care. Borra and Palma (2009) focus on the choice 
between five childcare modes (parents, relatives, sitter, daycare center, preschool care) without 
paying much attention to labor force participation. Michalopoulos and Robins (2000) consider 12 
different choices, four childcare modes and three employment levels. Our choice set is similar to 
Tekin’s (2007), but we separate within household care from other (paid and unpaid) informal 
care.  
The results in Tekin (2007) indicate that both a lower price for childcare and a higher 
(full time) wage increase both the overall employment level and the use of paid childcare by 
single mothers in the USA. The price elasticity of full time employment is estimated to be  0.139, 
while part time employment is found to be less sensitive to the price of childcare (elasticity equal 
to  0.068), which gives an overall price elasticity of employment of  0.121. This estimate is in the 
same  range  as  studies  that  use  similar  (multinomial  choice)  estimation  methods  for  married 
mothers in the USA. For example Ribar (1995) found an elasticity of  0.09, and Michalopoulos 
and Robins (2000) report  0.156. Blau and Hagy (1998) and Blau and Robins (1988) find slightly 
higher elasticities of  0.20 and  0.38 respectively. The picture that emerges from these estimates 
and from the more exhaustive review in Blau and Currie (2004) is that the price elasticity is likely 
to be small.  
The wage elasticity of employment is generally found to be larger than the price elasticity, 
and in general wages have a larger effect on full time than part time employment (Powell, 1998; 
Connelly and Kimmel, 2003). Tekin (2007) allows for different wage rates in part time and full 
time  jobs,  and  finds  that  the  full time  (hourly)  wage  has  a  much  stronger  effect  on  the 
employment decisions than the (hourly) wage that can be earned in a part time job. Overall, the 
elasticity of (total) employment with respect to the full time wage is 0.663, while it is 0.081 with 
respect to the part time wage.  
A meta analysis by Evers et al. (2008) suggests that the wage elasticity of female labor 
supply in Western Europe is slightly higher than in the USA. On the other hand, the elasticity 
with respect to the price of childcare is often found to be (even) lower than in the USA. For 
France, Choné et al. (2003) report a price elasticity of hours worked equal to  0.02. Wrohlich 
(2004) reports price elasticity of hours worked for Germany between  0.04 and  0.09, which is 
corroborated  in  Wrohlich  (2006)  using  a  longer  time frame.  Modeling  preferences  regarding 
labor supply and childcare in Norway, estimating the parameters of the utility function, Kornstad 
and Thoresen (2007) derive implied price elasticities of labor supply of  0.12 (participation) and 
 0.17 (hours worked). Their wage elasticities are 0.35 (participation) and 0.49 (hours). Lundin et 
al. (2008) show that in a market for childcare services where prices are already low (they use 
Swedish data), further price reductions have a negligible impact on female labor supply. page 5/24 
The  price  of  childcare  is  generally  found  to  have  some  effect  on  the  demand  for 
(paid/formal) childcare. Wrohlich (2006) finds an elasticity of  0.05 on the extensive margin and 
between  0.38 and  0.64 on the number of hours of childcare taken up. The range varies from a 
low of about  0.30 found for France (Choné et al. 2003) and the USA (Blau and Hagy, 1998), 
through  values  around   1.0  reported  by  Michalopoulos  and  Robins  (2000)  for  the  USA  and 
Canada, up to elasticities as high as  2 for childcare centers and  4 for sitters in Canada (Powell, 
2002). A strong price elasticity for daycare centers is reported also for Spain, while the cross 
elasticity of the price of daycare for other kinds of childcare varies between +1.0 and +1.5 (Borra 
and Palma, 2009). Slightly lower own and cross elasticities are reported for Australia (Doiron 
and Kalb, 2005), but also here it is established that other (unpaid, informal) childcare solutions 
are sought when the price of formal childcare is higher. 
In summary, the literature suggests that potential income has an effect on the participation 
decision and the number of hours worked, while the effect of childcare costs on the labor decision 
is small. Costs mainly have an effect on the chosen childcare solution: higher costs for formal 
childcare induce a shift from formal to informal care solutions. In all these studies and reviews, 
the attention for preferences and attitudes regarding female participation and usage of childcare is 
at best small, and in most cases not present.  
 
Importance of norms, values, and attitudes 
In social sciences other than economics, the impact of norms, values and opinions on individual 
behavior is a much more common research topic, and often considered to be the driving force of 
decisions (Van Deth and Scarbrough, 1995; Pfau Effinger, 1998; Hakim, 2000; Kremer, 2005). 
Monna and Gauthier (2008) review literature on socio economic factors, and argue that also the 
parents’ values, norms and ideologies are important in explanation of the time parents spend with 
their children. Evans and Kelley (2002) conclude that reservations about institutional day care for 
toddlers are mainly due to worries that the toddler receives insufficient affection in day care 
center and that there is no one to one relation with a teacher. More than half of the mothers 
(strongly) agree that toddlers ‘really need the attention of a full time mother’, while the statement 
‘a  pre school  child  is  likely  to  suffer  if  their  mother  works’  receives  more  support  than 
disagreement. People who consider institutional childcare as harmless more frequently approve 
day care and prefer longer work hours. On the other hand, 30% of all mothers prefer a part time 
job and only a small minority (4%) of the Australian mothers prefers a full time job (Evans and 
Kelley, 2002).  
Fagnani (2002) argues that discrepancies between the desires to be in employment and the 
attitudes towards public (non parental) childcare are the main cause for differences in fertility and 
employment rates between France and West Germany, two countries with largely similar family 
policies. For example, the believe that children under 3 years of age need to be with their mother 
is  much  more  widespread  among  West  German  mothers  than  it  is  among  French  mothers 
(Fagnani, 2002). In Germany, more mothers agree with the expression that ‘a pre school age page 6/24 
child suffers if their mother is employed’ and they also state more frequently that they won’t have 
a job as long as the child has not reached school age. Fagnani asserts that France has a much 
longer tradition of collective childcare then West Germany, which is reflected in the current 
opinions about the benefits of collective childcare compared to care by grandparents. More so 
than French mothers, German mothers feel that they have to make hard choices if they want to 
combine work and childcare. Also Kremer (2005) concludes that differences between welfare 
state  regimes  with  regard  to  the  financial  incentives  and  the  generosity  of  childcare  leave 
facilities cannot explain differences in labor force participation and take up of childcare services. 
Kremer attributes the observed variation to differences in the ideals of care dominant in the 
various countries. 
Joesch and Hiedemann (2002) link economic and psychological arguments and estimate 
that the effect of the price of childcare on the number of childcare hours is significantly negative 
but that the decision whether or not to use care is governed by different considerations. Their 
results suggest that 43% of the parents in the USA will never use childcare by non relatives even 
when  it  is  free  of  charge.  They  hypothesize  –  but  cannot  test  –  that  non relative  care  is 
unacceptable for many parents. 
 
Research in the Netherlands 
There are circumstances that make the situation in the Netherlands different from many other 
countries. Firstly, eligibility for subsidies is not an issue in the Netherlands, because the subsidies 
for  formal  care  are  available  for  all  households.  Paid  but  unsubsidized  childcare  in  the 
Netherlands is informally arranged care, and most informal caregivers do not get paid at all. 
Secondly, due to the large availability of part time jobs, the choice for within household parental 
care along with a (small) part time job is often made. In the Netherlands the structural differences 
between wages in part time and full time jobs are small because in essence every job can be done 
in part time without repercussions for the hourly wage. 
Graafland (2000) and Jongen (2010) calibrate applied general equilibrium models of the 
Dutch labor market and simulate the effects of changes in childcare subsidies on labor supply and 
formal childcare usage while maintaining overall budgetary restrictions. They conclude that the 
effect of subsidies on female labor supply is rather small. Higher subsidies stimulate the use of 
formal childcare, but for a large part the increase is due to replacement of informal care solutions 
by subsidized care. In a household production model, Maassen van den Brink and Groot (1997) 
estimate that the mother’s wage elasticity of labor supply equals 0.45 while the fathers’ income 
and non labor household income have no significant effect on the mother’s time allocation. The 
use  of  external  childcare  is  not  modeled,  but  they  find  that  mothers  of  very  young  children 
usually spend less time on labor than mothers with older children. Groot and Maassen van den 
Brink (1992) conclude that the price elasticity of childcare is high in the decision to use childcare, 
but is much lower for the number of hours. The elasticity of the labor supply decision with 
respect to the childcare price is virtually zero. Maassen van den Brink (1994) states that the wage page 7/24 
elasticity of labor supply is much higher than the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the 
childcare price. Wetzels (2005) finds a large and strongly significant positive effect of predicted 
wage on labor force participation. The predicted price of childcare, however, is not significant 
(and with a counterintuitive positive sign). Wetzels argues that the childcare costs have an effect 
of  substituting  formal  (expensive)  care  for  informal  (cheaper)  care,  but  not  on  labor  force 
participation.  
Ooms et al. (2007) model the joint decision of labor force participation and the use of 
formal childcare by Dutch mothers, and pay attention to the role of the social environment in the 
decision making  process.  Their  main  conclusions  are  that  the  mother’s  potential  wage  has  a 
positive effect both on labor force participation and on the number of hours worked, while other 
household income has a negative effect. Similar effects are found for the use of formal childcare. 
The  price  of  these  services  has  no  impact,  neither  on  the  labor  choice  nor  on  the  childcare 
solution, but it is concluded that the opinions held in the mother’s social environment are highly 
important. Also Van Dijk and Siegers (1996) find that modern norms of the husband and other 
network members have a positive effect on the labor supply of women with young children. Van 
Gameren and Ooms (2009) show that individual attitudes and opinions regarding childcare and 
work are important factors in the labor force participation and childcare utilization decisions of 
mothers with pre school age children. However, they do not analyze variations in the number of 
hours worked by mothers nor in the type of childcare (formal or informal) that is used. 
 
3. Analytical framework 
 
Decisions  by  young  mothers  regarding  labor  force  participation  and  use  of  childcare  are 
presumed to be closely  related. Discussions about policies aimed at stimulating female labor 
force participation therefore often contain a large  chapter about childcare services. Childcare 
services are considered to be an important prerequisite for young mothers to remain active in the 
labor market. It is known that career interruptions and spells of part time work at a young age are 
an important source of the worse labor market position of older women (Russo and Hassink, 
2008; Albrecht et al., 1999). Provision of subsidized childcare services can help to reduce the gap 
between men and women, but an increase in the availability or affordability of childcare will only 
lead to the desired effect if it really affects the mothers’ choices.  
Therefore, to predict the impact of public policies, it is highly relevant to have better 
insight in the factors that determine labor force participation and the use of childcare services. 
The literature review in the previous section reveals that childcare costs are often found to have 
small  effects  in  participation  decisions,  while  potentially  important  factors  as  attitudes  are 
typically not considered concurrently.  
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Theoretical model 
We start off from a utility maximization problem where the mother, the single decision maker, 
derives utility from consumption (C), leisure or more generally, time spent at home (L) and child 
quality  (Q)  (Connelly,  1992;  Ribar,  1995).  This  framework  is  extended  with  an  explicit 
representation of the utility derived from hours cared by an unpaid or informal carer (HINF) and 
with a direct effect of the choice (J) on the utility (Blau and Hagy, 1998; Tekin, 2007), 
U = U(C, L, Q, HINF, J; X1, u1),  
where X1 and u1 are observed and unobserved determinants of preferences. The effect of the 
chosen solution J represents fixed utility costs of the choice, e.g. a disutility from using a formal 
childcare solution or being employed attributable to a negative stigma if the social environment 
disapproves working mothers. Child quality (Q) can be described by a production function,  
Q = Q(L, HINF, HFOR, A; X2, u2),  
and depends on the number of hours that the mother spends with the child (L), the hours cared by 
formal (HFOR) and informal (HINF) caregivers, and on the quality of the external care (A). Under 
the assumption that external childcare is only used during the mother’s labor hours (H), and 
normalizing the total available time to one, the mother’s time constraint can be written as  
L + H = L +HINF + HFOR = 1. 
The monetary budget constraint balances the total income from work (at an hourly wage W) and 
other sources (Y) unrelated to the mother’s labor efforts, with the expenses on consumption (C) 
and formal childcare that is bought at a price per hour (P), 
H W + Y = C + P HFOR. 
The costs of within household and informal childcare are assumed to equal zero. 
Attitudes are not explicitly represented in the model, but their relevance can be illustrated 
with several model variables. The quality of the external care (A) in the child quality production 
function is one of the factors where the attitudes can be brought in. First of all, quality of care is 
not unambiguously defined; measures such as the child staff ratio, the educational level of the 
staff  members  or  the  facilities  in  the  childcare  center  are  inherently  incomplete  measures. 
Secondly, when deciding whether or not to bring a child to a childcare center, also the subjective 
impression or feeling about the quality of the care is relevant. Another variable where attitudes 
play a role is the direct disutility of the chosen care solution (J). Mothers who hold the attitude 
that childcare by others than themselves cannot be good for the child development will feel a 
larger disutility of the usage of external care than mothers who feel that interaction with other 
children in a childcare center contributes to a child’s development. Further, mothers who live 
among people who believe that mothers of young children should not work will feel a disutility 
when they decide to work because that choice will be disapproved by their social environment. 
The third place where attitudes enter the model is via the preference shifters X1 and u1. It is likely 
that  attitudes  regarding  childcare  directly  affect  the  preferences.  Most  often  attitudes  are 
unobservable, but we have data to our avail that contains information on these attitudes and we 
can therefore identify their role in the decision making process.  page 9/24 
A  growing  attention  for  the  role  of  attitudes  can  be  observed  among  economists. 
Experimental  research  in  laboratory  settings  has  shown  that  psychological  factors  influence 
economic decisions (Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Falk, 2002). However, doubts about the meaning of 
survey questions that ask for attitudes or opinions remain, because the responses bear the risk that 
expressed opinions are influenced by the decisions taken. Acknowledging the claimed effects, it 
seems  important  to  account  for  differences  in  attitudes  when  analyzing  the  effects  of  other 
aspects in the decisions regarding labor force participation and childcare use. Especially in the 
market for childcare services, one may expect that psychological factors can be decisive, since 
very few people will see their children purely as economic subjects.  
 
Empirical model 
For the labor force participation decision we make a distinction with regard to the number of 
hours worked instead of modeling it as yes or no decision, because the number of labor hours 
may be an important aspect for future career perspectives. We fold down the range of labor hours 
into three labor market states: non working mothers, mothers with a small part time job (1 16 
hours), and mothers with a large part time or a full time job (see the data section for details). For 
employed mothers we analyze which childcare mode is chosen, differentiating between three 
modes  (implying  a  total  of  seven  alternative  choices).  The  first  state,  work  without  external 
childcare, implies that in addition to the care provided by the mother the husband must provide a 
part of the care, or that the mother works only during school hours. The second category is 
typified by the use of informal care provided by grandparents, other relatives, friends or (paid or 
unpaid) informal sitters in addition to the parental care. The third alternative is to use formal 
childcare services. Formal (subsidized) childcare is provided by childcare centers and by sitters 
who work through a publicly certified agency (family day care). The government together with 
many  employers  pays  a  large  part  of  the  costs  that  households  make  for  the  use  of  formal 
childcare, while only a fraction is paid by the households themselves. Mothers who use both 
informal and formal childcare, for example because a grandmother cares for the children during 
some hours in addition to formal care, are included in the category of formal care users.  
The decisions at hand are naturally modeled via a multinomial choice model (see e.g. 
Michalopoulos and Robins, 2000; Powell, 2002; Tekin, 2007; Borra and Palma, 2009), which is 
embedded in the utility maximization framework outlined above. The utility Vij that mother i gets 
if she decides for state j is given by: 
  Vij = β’Xj Xi + βWj Wi + βPj Pi + β’Aj Ai + εij,        j=1, ..., 7,  (1) 
where Wi is the mother’s hourly wage and Pi is the price of formal childcare. The attitudes are 
represented  by  the  (vector)  Ai,  while  Xi  is  the  vector  of  other  characteristics  of  mother 
(household) i, such as the mother’s age, the number of children, and the father’s income. These 
characteristics do not vary between the states.  
Wages  and  childcare  prices  are  only  observed  for  working  mothers  and  for  users  of 
formal childcare. For the empirical set up we assume that the decisions with regard to work and page 10/24 
childcare are made while taking into consideration a potential hourly wage and a potential price 
per hour of formal childcare (see data section). We assume that the price of formal childcare Pi 
(varying between mothers) may affect the utility level of all alternatives j. This is plausible since 
a choice between childcare modes with different price levels will be made on the basis of a 
comparison of prices for formal and informal childcare. The price of informal childcare often 
equals zero, a large part of this type of childcare is given by grandparents or other relatives who 
generally remain unpaid; moreover, the variation in prices of paid informal sitters is large and 
does not have an obvious structure. Therefore we assume that the price of informal childcare is 
zero.
1 
Mother i will choose state j if this state gives the highest utility level, hence if Vij>Vik for 
all other states k≠j. The parameters that need to be estimated, for each state j, are the vector βXj 
along with βWj, βPj and βAj. Under the assumption that the error terms εij are i.i.d. draws from a 
type  1  extreme  value  distribution  we  obtain  the  standard  multinomial  logit  model  where  the 
probability Prij that mother i chooses state j, i.e. the probability Pr(yi= j)=Pr(Vij>Vik for all k≠j), is 
given by 
  Prij = exp(βXjXi+βWjWi+βPjPi+βAjAi) / {∑k=1
7 exp(βXkXi+βWkWi+βPkPi+βAkAi)},      j=1, ..., 7.  (2) 
Identification requires that one alternative is used as the reference state (with its parameters β 




The data come from the survey ‘Gebruik Kinderopvang’ (Use of childcare) organized by The 
Netherlands Institute of Social Research / SCP, which was held in March 2004 among women 
with children up to the age of 12, the age at which they finish primary education (Portegijs et al., 
2006). The survey was answered by 2003 mothers and contains information on working hours of 
both parents, childcare hours for different modes of care and prices paid for it, the net household 
income,  mother’s  age  and  her  level  of  education.  Furthermore  the  survey  contains  a  lot  of 
questions  on  the  mother’s  intentions  and  attitudes  with  respect  to  childcare  and  labor  force 
participation. Because of the small number of single parent households (about 6.5%) and because 
different factors may influence the choices made by single mothers, we focus on mothers in two 
parent households. We thus have a sample of 1753 households, representative for the about 1.2 
million two parent households with children aged 0 12 in the Netherlands. 
Table  1  gives  an  overview  of  the  actual  choices  made  by  households,  where  we 
distinguish the seven states in which a household can be situated (as defined above). Almost one 
third of the mothers are not employed, while about 30% have a job for 16 hours or less per week. 
The remaining 37% work at least 17 hours per week. Full time working mothers are rare. Only 
                                                 
1 Tekin (2007) includes prices of all childcare modes, but only in their ‘own’ equation. We argue that a high price of 
formal care not only reduces the utility of formal care, but that we cannot rule out that it also has a direct positive 
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3% of the mothers report a workweek of 36 or more hours (the group size would increase to 6.9% 
of all mothers if we reduce the threshold to 32 hours). Subdividing with respect to the chosen 
childcare solution results in very small groups that are nearly intractable by a multinomial choice 
model. Therefore we work with the categorization presented in table 1 and do not include full 
time work as a separate state. The questionnaire asked only about childcare related to labor hours; 
hence for non working mothers the childcare choice is not considered. We read from the table 
that 29.1% of the mothers do not use any external childcare. A smaller group of mothers (27.1%) 
exploit informal childcare solutions, while only 11.8% of all mothers with children aged between 
0 and 12 use a formal solution (possibly in combination with informal care). This means that also 
among  working  mothers  only  a  minority  of  17.4%  take  advantage  of  subsidized  childcare 
services.  
 
Table 1 Observed choices of labor force participation and childcare solution 
    % 
1  mother is not employed  32.1 
  mother works between 1 and 16 hours per week, and uses:   
2    no childcare  16.5 
3    informal childcare  11.8 
4    formal childcare  2.3 
  mother works more than 17 hours per week, and uses:   
5    no childcare  12.6 
6    informal childcare  15.3 
7    formal childcare  9.5 
  total  100% = 1753 obs. 
 
Table 2 lists the explanatory variables that are used to estimate the multinomial logit 
model  outlined  in  the  previous  section.  We  include  all  the  commonly  used  individual  and 
household  characteristics.  The  average  mother  in  the  sample  is  36.4  years  old  and  has  0.5 
children aged 0 3 and 1.3 children aged 4 12. We see that 42% of the households have one or 
more children aged 0 3, while in 80% at least one child in the primary school age (4 12 years) is 
present.  In 22% of the  households also older children are present. The average hourly wage 
earned  by  employed  mothers  equals  10.05  euro,  while  the  other  household  income  (which 
includes  the  father’s  labor  earnings)  is  1795  euro  per  month.  The  average  number  of  hours 
worked by the father, 38 hours, essentially equals a full time work week. The fathers’ labor 
decision is taken as exogenous, given the fact that almost all fathers are observed to be in full 
time employment. Informal ‘network’ childcare (care by the grandparents or other relatives) is 
available for about 80% of the households.
2 A variable that is not often available in empirical 
                                                 
2 Availability of a (paid or unpaid) informal sitter is not included as it highly depends on the effort put in finding one. 
The questions on the availability of formal services, which ask if providers are available within reasonable distance, 
are not used. About 90% of the mothers report that formal services are available in the vicinity. Nevertheless, a 
negative answer does not rule out the use of formal services, because the services will be available at a location that page 12/24 
research is the information about the mother’s labor status before her first pregnancy, which may 
reveal something about her work preferences. Before the first pregnancy, 67% of the sampled 
mothers used to work at least 24 hours per week while 18% held a small part time job.   
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics  
  mean  st.dev. 
age of the mother  36.4  5.8 
number of children aged 0 3  0.52  0.67 
number of children aged 4 12  1.27  0.89 
presence of children aged 0 3
a  0.422  0.494 
presence of children aged 4 12
a  0.795  0.404 
presence of children aged 13 or older
a  0.223  0.416 
weekly hours worked by the mother  12.6  11.0 
weekly hours worked by the partner  38.2  8.7 
mother works non standard office hours
a  0.151  0.358 
father works non standard office hours
a  0.129  0.335 
hourly wage (for working mothers, in euro)  10.05  3.20 
predicted hourly wage (for all mothers, in euro)  9.38  1.14 
other income, including father’s wage (euro per month)  1795  654 
predicted out of pocket price per hour (for all mothers, in euro)  2.93  1.55 
availability of network care (grandparents, other relatives)
a  0.805  0.396 
worked between 1 and 24 hours before first pregnancy
a  0.177  0.382 
worked 25 hours or more before first pregnancy
a  0.671  0.470 
father’s employer contributes in childcare costs or services
a  0.183  0.386 
a Dummy variable 
 
Hypothetical wages and prices 
Wages are only observed for working mothers and prices paid for childcare are known only for 
users of formal childcare. For the empirical model we need a (potential) hourly wage and a 
(potential)  price  per  hour  of  formal  childcare  for all  mothers.  We  construct  the  hypothetical 
earnings capacity of each mother based on the relation between observed wages, the level of 
education and experience (see Appendix A). We assume that this potential wage is what mothers 
have in mind when deciding about work and care, instead of the (endogenous) observed wage. 
The predicted hypothetical wage is 9.38 euro per hour, thus slightly lower than the observed 
wages (table 2). The mothers with higher earnings potential apparently choose to work more 
often than mothers with lower earnings potential. 
Formal childcare services are bought on a highly subsidized market where price variation 
between  households  is  mainly  driven  by  the  subsidy  system.  For  the  construction  of  the 
hypothetical price of childcare we mimic the subsidy system and construct the out of pocket 
                                                                                                                                                              
is not considered ‘near’. We assume that both informal sitters and formal services are available for all parents; 
without this assumption we would have to restrict the choice set for mothers who say that informal or formal care is 
unavailable.  page 13/24 
price per hour of formal childcare for each household (see Appendix B). The average predicted 
out of pocket price per hour of formal childcare equals 2.93 euro. 
Identification of the multinomial logit model is guaranteed through the exclusion of the 
mother’s  level  of  education,  one  of  the  main  wage  predictors,  from  the  model  (similar  to 
Connelly  &  Kimmel,  2003),  thus  avoiding  perfect  collinearity  between  the  wage  and  its 
predictors.  A  collinearity  problem  does  not  arise  for  the  childcare  costs  due  to  the  highly 
nonlinear function of total household income and number of children that is used to construct 
hypothetical childcare prices.  
 
Construction of attitudes 
In  the  questionnaire  mothers  were  asked  to  score  their  agreement  or  disagreement  with  34 
statements  regarding  the  acceptability  of  childcare  and  working  mothers.  All  mothers  in  the 
sample, regardless of their use of childcare and employment status, scored all statements on a 
scale of 1 (completely disagree) to 5 (completely agree). The correlation between the statements 
is large, and it is not a priori clear which are the most relevant; therefore, we use factor analysis 
to summarize the information. Two sets of statements were analyzed, the first set deals with 18 
opinions  on  childcare  while  the  second  deals  with  16  opinions  on  employment  and  the 
combination  of  employment  and  childcare.  In  the  multinomial  logit  model  we  include  two 
constructed factors, one from each set of statements, as measures of the mothers’ attitudes.
3 The 
first  factor,  Care  for  children  by  others  then  the  parents  is  OK,  is  based  on  responses  to 
statements about the acceptability to put a baby or toddler under the care of a professional sitter, a 
relative or an acquaintance, and on responses to questions about the importance of group playing 
for a child and the educational value of after school care. The other factor measures the attitude 
on working and is labeled as the Intrinsic value of working. It is based on statements like ‘To me 
working goes without saying’ and ‘Working is necessary for a fulfilling life’, on a statement 
about the importance of being financially independent, and on statements regarding the necessity 
of a job  for self actualization, for contacts with others, and for playing  an important  role in 
society. The factors are normalized to have a mean 0 and a standard deviation 1. The higher the 
score on a factor, the more the responding mother agrees with the statements that define the 
factor. 
 
                                                 
3 For each set, two factors contribute substantially (more than 10%) to the explained variance (see Ooms et al., 
2007). In the further analysis we use only one factor for each set, since the others, which can be labeled Children are 
best taken care of in their own environment (determined by statements such as ‘Children should be taken care of by 
their own parents’, ‘It is best for a toddler to be taken care of at his/her own home’ and ‘After school a child needs 
individual attention’) and Redistribution of household tasks is important (measuring the extent to which mothers 
think raising children is the task of the mother or also consider the father’s role important) are strongly correlated 
with the included factors and are not separately identifiable with the available instrumental variables.  page 14/24 
5. Results 
 
Endogeneity of attitudes 
Answers to the survey questions regarding attitudes are suspected to be endogenously determined 
by the actually chosen alternative, resulting in bidirectional causality. An instrumental variable 
approach accounts for endogeneity. However, in a nonlinear setting such as the multinomial logit 
model,  the  application  of  instrumental  variables  is  not  straightforward.  Mimicking  the  2SLS 
model by replacing the endogenous variables by their predicted counterparts from the first stage 
gives inconsistent estimates (Terza et al., 2008). A control function approach can be used when 
the endogenous explanatory variables are continuous (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007; Terza et 
al., 2008), which happens to be the case for the constructed attitude measures. Essentially the 
control function approach implies a two stage procedure where in the first stage the endogenous 
attitudes are explained using all exogenous variables and a set of instrumental variables, similarly 
as in a 2SLS model. The residuals from the first stage are added as explanatory variables in the 
second stage in addition to the exogenous variables and the (endogenous) attitudes.  
Good instruments are variables that have a strong relation with the endogenous variables 
(in our case, the attitudes) while not being affected by the model’s dependent variable (the work 
childcare choice). The set of instrumental variables that we propose contains information on the 
social environment of the mother; in particular on the prevailing habits in the mother’s vicinity 
regarding  working  mothers  and  fathers.  Also  used  is  information  on  the  work history  of  the 
respondent’s  mother  (see  Appendix  C).  These  variables  are  likely  to  influence  the  mother’s 
attitudes  while  being  ‘given’  for  individual  mothers:  The  social  environment  and  the 
grandmother’s behavior directly affect the attitudes of the interviewed mother. At the same time, 
the influence of an individual mother’s choice on the habits in her social environment is small, 
and  is  non existent  with  regard  to  decisions  that  the  respondent’s  mother  made  during  the 
respondent’s childhood.  
Tests reveal that the instruments have strong explanatory power for the attitudes. For the 
factor Care for children by others then the parents is OK the LR statistic is 39.2 while for the 
Intrinsic value of working we find a value of 79.1 for the LR statistic, which follows a χ
2(10) 
distribution in both cases and thus strongly rejects irrelevance of the instruments. The quality of 
the instruments is further analyzed in the framework of a series of binary probit models for each 
of the seven possible alternatives. In this framework we can perform formal overidentification 
tests, which check if exclusion of the instruments from the main equation is valid. For none of the 
alternatives the validity of the instruments is rejected; the highest value of the Amemiya Lee 
Newey minimum chi square statistic, distributed χ
2(8), is 12.0, which gives a p value of 0.153 
and thus does not give reason to reject instrument validity. For most alternatives exogeneity of 
the attitudes is rejected, and therefore controlling for endogeneity is advisable.  
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Independence of irrelevant alternatives 
An implicit assumption underlying the multinomial logit model is the independence of irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), which dictates that the choice from a set of alternatives is not affected if non 
chosen alternatives are made unavailable. The validity of this assumption can be tested by a 
Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984). Tests in the model presented in this section do 
not reject the null hypothesis that the choice between two alternatives is unaffected by the other 
choices,  so  we  conclude  that  the  IIA assumption  is  supported  by  the  data  and  that  it  is  not 
necessary to use more complicated models such as a multinomial probit or a nested logit that do 
not  impose  this  restriction.  Further,  a  series  of  likelihood  ratio  tests  is  performed  to  see  if 
alternatives can be combined. The tests indicate that there is no set of two alternatives that can be 
combined into one. 
 
Estimation results 
Table 3 presents the results of the multinomial logit model set up above, with the alternative 
‘mother does not work’ as reference category. We see that a higher hourly out of pocket price of 
formal childcare has an insignifcant effect on all alternatives. An insignificant effect of childcare 
price on participation is in line with other studies in the Netherlands (Maassen van den Brink, 
1994;  Wetzels,  2005;  Van  Gameren  and  Ooms,  2009)  while  the  counterintuitive  positive 
(although insignificant) effect on the choice for a large part time job combined with (in)formal 
care is also found by Wetzels (2005). Note that a large job with formal care does not imply a lot 
of childcare hours. With a large job it becomes easier to pay at least some hours of formal care, 
making it a more attractive option than a small part time job combined with formal care, where a 
large negative (but still insignifcant) price effect is found. The higher the mother’s hourly wage, 
the higher the probability  that she is employed in a job with more labor hours, in line with 
economic theory and empirical research. A higher earnings potential stimulates to work more 
hours  but  does  not  imply  that  formal  childcare  services  are  used;  however,  it  increases  the 
probability of the alternatives with formal care more than the other choices. The effect of the 
other household income (which includes the partner’s labor income) significantly stimulates the 
choice  for  a  small  part time  job  with  a  formal  childcare  solution,  and  uniformly  (although 
insignficantly) reduces the probability to work longer hours.  
Despite the sometimes insignificant effects, we ease comparison with the literature by 
presenting the implied wage and price elasticities in table 4, both for the model with attitudes 
(i.e.,  table  3)  as  well  as  for  a  model  without  attitudes.
4  In  both  cases  the  price  elasticity  of 
participation is small, similar to other research. The negative impact is slightly stronger for small 
part time jobs, for which the total earnings are lower than for jobs with more hours and thus the 
same increase in the costs of childcare is conceived as a larger burden. The elasticity of labor 
force participation with respect to the hypothetical hourly wage is much larger than the price 
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elasticity. The wage elasticity of 1.73 for the total participation rate is higher than the 0.5 that 
Evers et al. (2008) report for all women in the Netherlands. A higher elasticity for mothers with 
young children than for women in general may be due to the different consequences of the choice 
to participate. Accounting for attitudes results in a similar elasticity (0.40) as found for women in 
general. Without controlling for attitudes, a large increase of (formal) childcare is found when 
earning  capacity  increases,  but  only  a  fraction  remains  after  we  account  for  attitudes.  The 
household’s economic and financial situation appear of great importance for the mother’s choice 
regarding labor force participation and childcare solutions, but the effects are much smaller after 
controlling for attitudes. 
Overall,  the  attitudes  are  strongly  significant,  their  inclusion  improves  the  model’s 
explanatory  power  (table  3;  LR  test  of  a  model  without  attitudes:  χ
2(12)=84.3,  p=0.000). 
Agreement  with  the  attitude  that  care  for  children  by  others  then  the  parents  is  alright 
unequivocally increases the probability that the mother is employed. These mothers are more 
likely to use external (informal or formal) childcare services, mainly with a small part time job. 
Mothers who have a positive attitude towards working are indeed more likely to be employed, 
and are more likely to accept a job with longer hours. The stronger effects are found for the 
alternatives with external (formal or informal) care. The estimates suggest that the effect of a 
‘modernization’  of  the  attitudes  held  by  mothers,  represented  by  more  agreement  with  the 
constructs included in the analysis, will have a larger impact on choices regarding participation 
and childcare than a further increase in the subsidies for childcare.  
Positive effects on all alternatives are found from employment before the first pregnancy, 
implying that mothers with an initially stronger attachment to the labor market are more likely to 
have a job after child birth. However, the effect on the alternatives with formal childcare is small 
and insignificant, both for mothers who used to work in a small part time job or in a larger job, 
while strongly significant positive effects on informal care solutions are found. The household 
composition is relevant; the more children aged 0 3 there are, the smaller the probability that the 
mother is working. With very young children the preferred choice seems to be the withdrawal 
from the labor market. The negative effect is significant only for the choices without external 
care;  it  is  difficult  to  combine  work  with  the  care  for  babies  and  toddlers  when  there  is  no 
additional  support.  For  children  aged  4 12  it  is  easier  to  combine  work  and  care  without 
additional support because these children spent a large part of the day in school. Availability of 
network care, i.e. grandparents or other relatives, increases the probability that the mother is 
working, primarily with an informal childcare solution. 
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Table 3 Determinants of labor force participation and childcare use 
  part time, no care  part time, informal  part time, formal  full time, no care  full time, informal  full time, formal 
predicted hourly costs (log)   0.235  (0.415)  0.020  (0.590)   1.469  (1.221)   0.019  (0.461)  0.178  (0.614)  0.424  (0.532) 
predicted hourly wage (log)   0.014  (1.213)   1.051  (1.364)  1.824  (2.790)  2.588*  (1.429)  2.770*  (1.471)  4.069**  (1.822) 
other monthly income (including fathers’ wage) (log)   0.376  (0.564)   0.553  (0.853)  2.629*  (1.583)   0.788  (0.633)   0.729  (0.867)   0.456  (0.682) 
number of children aged 0 3   0.642**  (0.257)   0.170  (0.289)   0.701  (0.608)   1.062*** (0.351)   0.375  (0.299)  0.102  (0.336) 
number of children aged 4 12  0.349*  (0.185)  0.411*  (0.233)   0.540  (0.528)   0.005  (0.215)  0.064  (0.239)   0.346  (0.279) 
presence of children aged 13 or older   0.641*** (0.236)  0.139  (0.368)   0.043  (13.255)  0.641**  (0.286)  0.095  (0.343)   1.449  (5.789) 
age of the mother   0.001  (0.154)   0.050  (0.194)  0.950** (0.479)  0.396**  (0.197)  0.220  (0.178)  0.795***  (0.287) 
age squared (x100)   0.023  (0.202)   0.071  (0.273)   1.543** (0.696)   0.555**  (0.255)   0.405*  (0.243)   1.187***  (0.399) 
worked between 1 and 24 hrs before first pregnancy
  0.826*** (0.291)  1.947*** (0.554)  0.005  (7.009)  0.020  (0.384)  0.935**  (0.404)  0.274  (1.367) 
worked 25 hrs or more before first pregnancy  0.449  (0.317)  1.549*** (0.566)  0.125  (6.335)  0.251  (0.362)  0.846**  (0.402)  0.486  (1.340) 
weekly hours worked by the father    0.057  (0.273)  0.871**  (0.424)  2.203  (1.527)   0.640**  (0.266)  0.250  (0.410)   0.049  (0.520) 
father works non standard office hours   0.076  (0.273)   0.048  (0.314)  0.276  (3.916)  0.171  (0.290)  0.177  (0.290)   0.430  (0.452) 
availability of network care  0.068  (0.225)  1.639  (2.532)   0.196  (1.113)  0.001  (0.289)  1.788*  (0.922)   0.524  (0.405) 
father’s employer contributes in childcare costs    0.903*** (0.338)   0.553  (0.381)  0.930  (0.579)   0.279  (0.391)  0.203  (0.336)  0.552  (0.422) 
care for children by others then the parents is OK  1.222  (0.789)  1.639*  (0.911)  3.509** (1.598)  1.066  (0.987)  0.905  (0.895)  1.894  (1.172) 
intrinsic value of working  0.789  (0.545)  2.402*** (0.673)  2.119** (0.997)  1.964*** (0.713)  3.169*** (0.638)  4.081***  (0.777) 
Constant  2.463  (5.669)  1.529  (7.636)   46.678** (18.609)   5.130  (6.404)   7.370  (8.368)   20.651  (8.040) 
             
#observations  1753
LogLikelihood   2282.2
Wald test of constant only model  822.1***  χ
 2(108): p=0.000
Wald test of attitudes and opinions  84.3***  χ
2(12): p=0.000
Wald test of control function (exogeneity test)  33.9***  χ
2(12): p=0.001
pseudo R
2  0.265          
Multinomial logit model, reference category: not employed. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses (500 replications, resampling with replacement, confidence intervals based 
on normal approximation). The residuals from the first stage regressions of the opinion measures are not listed apart from the Wald test of their significance. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 4 Elasticities of employment and childcare solutions 
















employment             
  small part time job (1 16 hours)   0.204   0.654  0.082   0.146   1.067   0.023 
  large part time or full time job (17+ hours)  0.010  3.816   0.372  0.134  2.049   0.379 
  participation (overall)   0.090  1.725   0.159   0.014  0.396   0.190 
childcare solution             
  informal childcare   0.024  2.533   0.301  0.134  0.316   0.295 
  formal childcare   0.158  6.679  0.486  0.045  2.849  0.560 




In a multinomial choice framework we have analyzed the determinants of the joint labor force 
participation and childcare use decision by mothers with one or more children aged between 0 
and 12 in the Netherlands. Three labor market states are distinguished: non working, working in 
a  small  part time  job,  and  working  in  a  large  part time  or  full time  job.  Full time  working 
mothers are rare and therefore not included as a separate category. For working mothers three 
childcare solutions are considered: within household care by the parents, informal childcare by 
grandparents, relatives, friends or informal sitters, and formal (subsidized) childcare. In addition 
to the explanatory factors that are commonly included in similar models, we could benefit from 
quite detailed information about the mother’s attitudes towards work and childcare. The focus of 
the  paper  is  on  the  role  of  individually held  attitudes  in  the  decision making  process.  Their 
potential  endogeneity  is  acknowledged  through  an  instrumental  variable  procedure  using 
information on the mother’s social environment.  
The inclusion of attitudes on childcare and work has a notable impact on the estimated 
income effects. The results show that, whether or not including the attitudes in the model, the 
mother’s earnings capacity is relevant in the explanation of the observed decisions, as is, to a 
lesser extent, the general economic situation of the household. However, although the positive 
effects of the mother’s earnings capacity on participation and childcare use appear large when we 
do  not  take  into  account  the  attitudes,  they  are  much  smaller  when  we  control  for  them. 
Especially the effect on the use of formal childcare changes a lot. In contrast with economic 
theory, the price of formal childcare has a negligible effect on the decisions. The finding that the 
(potential) wage and other sources of income are more important than the price of childcare is in 
line with national and international research. The attitudes themselves are strongly significant, 
confirming the suggestion by Joesch and Hiedemann (2002) that attitudes are decisive factors in 
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Stimulation of the use of formal childcare services is a standing policy in the Netherlands, 
with the ultimate goal to maintain the attachment to the labor market of young mothers and let 
them  use  their  economic  capacities  and  qualities  in  a  beneficial  way,  avoiding  career 
interruptions with potentially long lasting negative effects. Our results imply that the effects of 
economic incentives can be expected to be small if they are not supported by a change in the 
attitudes regarding childcare and the work attitudes. This finding is in line with a longitudinal 
analysis of Bosch et al. (2010) who conclude that the decision to work part time is not very 
sensitive for tax incentives but more depends on (societal) preferences.
5 Of course the absence of 
a  price  effect  does  not  mean  that  Dutch  mothers  are  completely  insensitive  to  the  price  of 
childcare, but it indicates that in the prevailing system of market prices and subsidies the price 
cannot explain the (non ) use of formal care. Under a different, less generous subsidy system, 
Maassen van den Brink (1994) found a price effect as predicted by economic theory. Since then, 
female labor force participation has increased and subsidies have been introduced with the intent 
to  guarantee  access  to  affordable  childcare  services.  Over  the  years,  the  availability  of 
professional  childcare  services  has  improved,  and  probably  the  continued  attention  and 
discussion about childcare in politics and in the news media has resulted in a shift of opinions on 
work and childcare (Jongen, 2010). Recent research in the Netherlands and other countries with 
accessible childcare often finds zero or negligible price effects. A limitation of our analysis is that 
the data do not provide objective quality measures of the childcare services. A review in Jongen 
(2010) shows that quality indicators in the Netherlands score good internationally, although there 
are signals that attention is required to maintain quality standards (Vermeer et al., 2008). The 
scarce  research  in  the  Netherlands  does  not  find  significant  positive  or  negative  effects  of 
extensive non maternal childcare for the children’s development (Van IJzendoorn et al., 2004). 
Taken  together,  these  findings  suggest  that  objective  quality  differences  between  childcare 
centers are small and are not likely to be the main issue for decisions. Furthermore, objective 
differences will reflect in mothers’ subjective opinions about quality.  
It appears that availability of childcare at an affordable price has been achieved, but has 
not eliminated the importance of the attitudes regarding childcare and work for the decisions. 
Mother’s  preferences  for  leisure  and  maternal  care  for  their  children  are  important  factors. 
Building a more positive attitude toward childcare and work seems to be of larger importance 
nowadays  than  pure  economic  factors.  Modernization  of  attitudes  regarding  labor  force 
participation and childcare services, in particular convincing mothers of the quality of available 
childcare services and of the potential benefits for their children, is of ultimate importance for the 
stimulation of labor force participation of mothers with  young children. In the setting of the 
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reduction of the parental contribution by about 50% but also by a formalization of grandparents’ care (Jongen, 2010). 
By officially paying them as ‘family day carers’, a formal childcare regulation, grandparents qualified for financial 
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Netherlands, policies aimed at attitudes may have a larger impact on participation and childcare 
usage than investments in infrastructure and higher subsidies. 
 
Appendix A. Wage equation 
Following  Connelly  (1992),  Tekin  (2007),  and  many  others,  a  Mincerian  wage  equation 
explaining log wage by attained education and work experience is estimated in order to calculate 
the mothers’ potential hourly labor income. Education is measured in four classes (primary or 
lower  secondary,  higher  general  secondary,  higher  professional  secondary,  tertiary).  Work 
experience is proxied by age and age squared, because we have no information on the time spent 
outside the labor market. We include information on whether the woman was employed before 
her first pregnancy. Because the sample of observed incomes is an endogenous selection of all 
mothers,  we  estimate  a  model  that  accounts  for  this  selectivity  (table  A1).  We  identify  the 
selection by information on the number of children, the father’s labor decision, and childcare 
availability, information that does not have a direct effect on the mother’s earnings capacity. In 
line with the theory, we find that mothers with a higher level of education have higher wages. 
Age has a parabolic but insignificant effect on the wage, while experience obtained with work 
before pregnancy has a positive effect on the wage. The results are used to calculate the potential 
hourly wage for all the mothers in the sample.  
 
Table A1 Wage equation with sample selection 
  log hourly wage  selection equation 
education: higher general secondary   0.071**  (0.034)  0.088  (0.118) 
education: higher professional secondary   0.117*** (0.024)  0.390*** (0.080) 
education: tertiary   0.277*** (0.027)  0.688*** (0.107) 
age of the mother   0.017  (0.017)  0.178*** (0.058) 
age squared (x100)  0.031  (0.023)   0.225*** (0.079) 
worked between 1 and 24 hours before first pregnancy
a  0.087**  (0.042)  0.675*** (0.113) 
worked 25 hours or more before first pregnancy
a  0.144*** (0.038)  0.832*** (0.094) 
other income (including fathers’ wage) (log)       0.363*** (0.103) 
number of children aged 0 3       0.276*** (0.070) 
presence of children aged 4 12       0.198*** (0.047) 
presence of children aged 13 or older      0.040  (0.103) 
weekly hours worked by the father       0.008*  (0.004) 
father  works non standard office hours      0.101  (0.101) 
availability of network care      0.566*** (0.086) 
father’s employer contributes in childcare costs       0.523*** (0.099) 
Constant  2.200*** (0.305)   1.039  (1.231) 
         
r  0.030  (0.089)     
#observations  1191    1753   
LogLikelihood   1220.3       
Wald test of constant only model  154.04*** χ
2(7): p=0.000     
Wald test of independent equations (r=0)   0.12  χ
2(1): p=0.733     
Heteroskedasticity corrected standard errors in parentheses;* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix B. Costs of childcare 
The (publicly certified but privately owned and run) childcare providers charge a market price, 
but  competition  in  this  market  is  limited  (Kok  et  al.,  2005)  and  price  variation  between 
households is mainly driven by the subsidy system. Total costs are partly paid by the parents 
while the employer(s) and the government pay the major part. The parental contribution is a 
percentage of total costs, found in the adviestabel, a table composed by the Ministry of Social 
Affairs  and  Employment  (SZW,  2003).  It  depends  on  the  before tax  household  income  (the 
higher the income, the higher the out of pocket contribution), and on the number of children that 
attend childcare services (the out of pocket contribution for the first child is much higher than the 
contribution for the other children). We approximate the official table by a simpler formula, and 
use that to simulate the households’ hypothetical price of an hour of childcare.
6  
The before tax household income is derived from a hypothetical net monthly household 
income. To guarantee that the childcare costs do not depend on the mother’s actual labor choice, 
we construct the monthly net household income as the sum of the observed father’s labor and 
other household income, and the income the mother would have if she would work 16 hours per 
week (on the edge between a small and a large part time job) and gets paid her potential hourly 
wage (see Appendix A). Together with the observed number of children, this determines the 
household’s percentage out of pocket contribution in the total childcare costs. 
The parental contribution is translated into a price per hour of  childcare. We use the 
median price per hour of childcare, which is slightly higher for school aged children than for 
babies and toddlers, 5.52 vs. 5.24 euro per hour (Deloitte, 2004). We account for the fact that for 
a child aged 0 3 the number of hours of formal childcare is about 2.5 times higher than for a child 
aged 4 12, because the latter spend a large part of the day in school (Kok et al., 2005; Jongen, 
2010).
7  The  total  (hypothetical)  costs  for  a  household  are  obtained  by  multiplication  of  the 
number of children in each age group with the number of hours per child, the price per hour, and 
the percentages (for first resp. later children) from the adviestabel. Division of thus obtained total 
costs by the total number of childcare hours gives the hypothetical out of pocket price per hour of 
childcare that parents are faced with. The average of the hence calculated hypothetical price is in 
line with the parental contributions as reported in Kok et al. (2005) and the observations in our 
data. 
                                                 
6 The (percentage) out of pocket contribution for the first child in childcare of a household with a monthly taxable 
income y (x 1000 euro) is approximated by oopc
1=  10.51 +11.42 y +1.245 y
2  0.129 y
3 if 1.271≤y≤4.771. The 
minimum contribution is oopc
1=5 if y<1.271, and the maximum, oopc
1=59.5, is charged if y>4.771. For households 
with more than one child in childcare, the minimum contribution for the other children is the same as for the first 
child (oopc
2=5 if y<1.271), but the contributions for the other children are much lower at higher income level: 
oopc
2=5.7 if 1.271≤y≤2.264, oopc
2=  2.050 +2.417 y +0.662 y
2  0.0653 y
3 if 2.264<y≤4.771, and oopc
2=17.9 if 
y>4.771.  
7  The  estimation  results  are  rather  insensitive  for  the  assumption  regarding  the  mother’s  labor  hours  and  the 
difference in average number of hours of childcare for pre school and school aged children. An additional correction 
of the prices, accounting for the fact that most childcare centers charge per (half) day even if the client does not use 
all hours, has no consequences at all for the estimated (log) price effects but gives only a small change in the 
estimate of the constant term. page 22/24 
 
Appendix C. Social environment 
Table A2 list the variables that describe the social environment used as instrumental variables. 
 
Table A2 Descriptive statistics of the social environment variables  
  mean  standard 
deviation 
in my environment, it is common that mothers are working
q  3.799  0.997 
in my environment, it is common that fathers are working fulltime
q  4.409  0.873 
my mother did not have a job
b  0.653  0.476 
my mother had a job since I went to school
b  0.114  0.317 
my mother has always had a job
b  0.132  0.338 
when my mother was working, my father cared for me
c  0.048  0.214 
when my mother was working, older brothers/sisters cared for me
c  0.012  0.109 
when my mother was working, other relatives or sitters cared for me
c  0.042  0.200 
my mother worked at home
c  0.069  0.254 
my mother worked during school hours
c  0.165  0.371 
a Five point scale, ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5) 
b Dummy variables, reference category: mother worked sometimes/no information available 
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